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Abstract 
 
 
This paper contributes to the debate over the relationship between inequality and growth 
by proposing that the disparities in empirical studies derive from the fact that they have 
not accounted for the level of inequality as a factor that can affect the sign of the 
relationship. An inverted “U” shaped relationship is demonstrated, showing that low 
levels of inequality exert a positive correlation with economic growth while high levels 
have a negative one. Additionally, and more importantly, it is demonstrated the 
existence of an optimal rate of inequality (ORI) that maximizes growth rates and 
releases the economy from any distortion generated by elevated inequality or taxation. 
Empirical evidence from a broad panel of countries as well as a bibliometric analysis is 
presented to validate these propositions. 
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Over the last two decades there has been a continuous debate over which is the true 
relationship between income inequality and economic growth. Empirical studies have 
found a series of contradictory results, from the ones who affirm a negative relationship 
(Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; Clarke, 1995; Perotti, 1993; Alesina and Perotti, 1996; 
Persson and Tabellini, 1994; Perotti, 1996; Kremer and Chen, 2002; Castelló and 
Doménech, 2002; De la Croix & Doepke (2003),  Josten, 2003; Ahituv and Moav 
(2003); Viaene and Zilcha, 2003; Josten, 2004; Castello-Climent, 2004; Knowles, 2005; 
Davis, 2007 and Pede et al., 2009), the ones who find a positive one (Partridge, 1997; 
Forbes, 2000; Li and Zou, 1998; Nahum, 2005), a non linear correlation (Barro, 2000; 
Banerjee and Duflo, 2003; Pagano, 2004; Voitchovsky, 2005; Bengoa and Sanchez-
Robles (2005); Barro, 2008; Castello-Climent, 2010) to the studies who assert an 
inexistent one or a non conclusive (Lee and Roemer, 1998; Panizza, 2002; Castelló and 
Doménech, 2002).  
 
Although the sources of information in the empirical studies are, in many cases, the 
same1, authors have incorporated diverse variations in the characteristics of their works 
in order to find the “real” relationship between inequality and growth and conciliate the 
differences in the literature.  Either by upgrading the quality of the data, employing 
different methodologies in the estimation of the models2, reducing or incrementing the 
time horizon of the expected effects from inequality to growth, testing different 
transmission mechanisms to explain the relationship or by including dummies in the 
estimation, none of them have taken into account the level of inequality as a potential 
cause for the discrepancy in the results. 
 
Before asking ourselves if income inequality is positively or negatively related to 
economic growth we should question if the phenomenon is “natural” or at least 
expected in the context of a market economy, where it is generally accepted that the 
income level of its members is at least partially determined by its marginal productivity 
                                                 
1 Among the most influential are the databases from Deininger and Squire (1996), more recently the one 
compiled by the World Income Inequality Database (WIID) and, for the socio-economical variables, the 
database from Barro and Lee (1993). 
2 Such as ordinary least squares (OLS), generalized method of moments (GMM), Three stage least 
squares (3SLS), seemingly unrelated regression (SUR), fixed or random effects estimation, Arellano and 
Bond (1991)  type estimations, among others. 
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and by the comparative advantages that he/she displays as a result of its economic 
performance.  
 
Rousseau (1755) declared more than two centuries ago, on his discourse on the origins 
of inequality, that in the moment when ancient man departed from the natural state and 
came to create the first societies, the foundations for the generation of inequalities 
among individuals were set. Meaning that individuals, as they became part of groups in 
which private property existed and where each of them, performing a specific role, 
interact with the other, the conditions were set for the differentiation of individuals and 
for inequality to exist. 
 
Later in that century, Adam Smith made a statement that endorses the existence of 
differences between individuals which generate inequalities as an intrinsic part of the 
economic system. Smith declared that it is the division of labor and not the inherent 
characteristics of individuals what causes “the very different genius which appears to 
distinguish men of different professions” (Smith, 1776, p.p. 15-16). Further on his 
wealth of nations he even implies a positive relation between the accumulation of 
wealth by rich individuals (in the form of gold and silver) and the enrichment of a 
country (Smith, 1776, p. 326). 
 
Schumpeter refers in this way to the incentives that motivate the performance of 
individuals in a bourgeois society: 
 
It unleashes, with inexorable speed, the promises of wealth and the threat of 
ruin with which penalizes economic behavior ... These rewards are not 
distributed randomly ... require skill, energy and work capacity above normal, 
but if it were necessary to measure this skill or the personal input that goes 
into a particular success, the rewards that are actually paid would probably be 
considered disproportionate ... thus giving an impetus far more powerful than 
would a more fair distribution. (Schumpeter, 1942, p.109) 
 
The reasons for the existence of income inequality in any society can be numerous; 
from the result of land distribution and rural-urban conditions, to more endogenously 
determined ones like the characteristics or circumstances intrinsic to individuals and 
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which can potentially determine their future income as the result of influencing their 
comparative advantages. Innate abilities, intelligence, personality, charisma, or even 
physical attributes such as strength or skills are some of the most fundamental causes 
why individuals may differentiate themselves from others. These differences can be 
determinants in the current and future income of any individual. 
 
Additionally, the variety of preferences among individuals can potentiate or undermine 
any physical or intellectual attribute. These preferences are in fact influenced by social 
and cultural values due to the fact that they are in general constructed as the result of 
collective inertia derived of costumes, traditions, idiosyncrasy and other variables such 
as history and geography which can determine the individual’s attitude towards certain 
preferences or choices such as work, education, and risk aversion. 
 
If we agree that a certain amount of inequality is natural and even necessary in a market 
economy, then the question should rather be how much inequality is harmful for 
growth? To inquire only if inequality is harmful or beneficial to economic growth, as 
most studies implicitly do, requires to expect a linear answer and to assume the levels of 
inequality do not play any role in defining the relationship; in other words, it implies the 
effects of inequality over growth to be the same regardless of its magnitude. Moreover, 
to imply the possibility of agreeing on a general positive or negative relationship would 
mean either to reach recommendations to economies (regardless of their specific 
context, i.e. their current inequality level or their democratic status) for actively 
promoting permanent increases in their inequality levels or the opposite if it where the 
case. 
 
Only a few studies (Barro, 2000; Banerjee and Duflo, 2003; Pagano, 2004; 
Voitchovsky, 2005; Bengoa, 2005; Barro, 2008; Castello-Climent, 2010) have found a 
non linear relationship between inequality and growth. Nevertheless, these studies 
attribute the change in the tendency to causes which are exogenous to the level of 
inequality3 and, in most cases, directly related to the determinants of economic growth 
or to the income level of the country.  
 
                                                 
3 Banerjee and Duflo attribute the negative relationship to changes in inequality but the effect comes from 
the economic distortions generated by distributive decisions at any level of inequality.  
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Barro (2000) and (2008) finds, after estimating for different income levels4, a positive 
and significant relationship between income inequality and growth for rich countries5 
and a negative one for poor countries. These results imply, among other things, that in a 
country with low income levels, the more redistribution and lower inequality, the higher 
will the growth rate be. On the other hand, in countries with high per capita income 
(above the break point level), as the levels of inequality rise, the economy will 
experience more growth, derived from the proposed positive relationship. Pagano 
(2004) finds the same relationship on his study after dividing the sample into OECD 
and non-OECD countries. Additionally, he finds an inverse negative relationship 
between growth and inequality. 
 
One could ask if the non linearity is sustainable at any level at both sides of the 
relationship, this is, if poor countries will need to virtually eliminate inequality (with all 
the implications of this extreme and improbable case) in order to reach the higher 
growth rates, or if rich countries trying to maximize growth or maintain the income 
level should promote increasingly high levels of inequality.  
 
Moreover, these findings entail that there is a level of per capita income (the break point 
income level) associated with low economic growth, meaning that countries with 
income levels situated at the break point are in the worst case scenario, facing an 
income trap with the lowest possible growth rates at a point in which inequality (or the 
lack of it) does not affect growth in any way and where the decisions of how to promote 
potential growth would imply stimulating it through determinants that are not affected 
by the inequality - growth relationship, while promoting income inequality in order to 
spur the positive relationship predicted for the countries above the break point income 
level. 
 
This interpretation also implies that a country in the path from low to high income per 
capita levels would have to go through the following phases in order to maximize 
growth performance: 
                                                 
4 Barro (2008: p.p.6-7) finds when running the model with the full sample a negative and significant 
relationship between inequality and growth due to, “the fact that for most of the sample, the estimated 
effect of inequality on growth is in the negative range”  
5 In Barro (2000) the breakpoint occurs at an income level of approximately $2,000 (1985 US dollars), 
and in Barro (2008) around $11,900 (in 2000 US dollars). 
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Phase 1 Implementing redistributive policies with the purpose of lowering 
inequality and incrementing the growth rate. 
Phase 2  Achieving growths through mechanisms not affected by inequality nor 
related to it, in order to surpass the income break point. 
Phase 3   Promoting an increase in inequality levels in order to promote higher 
growth rates (derived from the positive relationship). 
 
Note that in the context of this non-linear relationship, the income level is the 
determinant factor for the effects of income inequality over economic growth. The 
income level determines its rate of growth or reduction for a given inequality level in a 
country, thus making this economy contradictory with the established Kuznets (1955) 
inverted “U” hypothesis in which, countries, in their path to development, will 
experience first an increase in their levels of inequality, followed by a decrease as they 
further develop. This predicted initial rise in income inequality at low income levels 
would hold back the economy from further growing due to the negative relationship 
between inequality and growth predicted in this relationship. Furthermore, if a country 
could reach higher income levels and inequality starts to descend, as predicted by 
Kuznets, more growth would be difficult due to the positive relationship existing now 
between inequality and growth at high income levels. 
 
The only study found to suggest a relationship between inequality and growth that could 
be determined by the level of inequality, this is, that account for the fact that different 
levels of inequality can exert different types of effects it the study developed by Cornia 
et al. (2004), nevertheless, this hypothesis is presented only at a theoretical level and not 
proven empirically. 
  
Another study which finds a non linear relationship is the one carried out by Banerjee 
and Duflo (2003) who measure the effects of changes in inequality on economic growth 
in the short run and find that movements (in any direction) are associated with reduced 
growth in the next period. Under this view, if an economy could reach a circumstance in 
which no distributional conflicts were in place, economic growth would be higher. At 
this point, any change in redistribution (either positive or negative) would lower the 
growth rate.  
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These results are consistent with an inverted “U” shaped relationship between inequality 
and growth which was justified using political economy and wealth effect arguments. 
Note that the authors do not acknowledge the level of inequality as a cause for the non-
linearity and assume that the absolute changes in inequality are the ones responsible for 
distorting growth. Their results imply, among other things, that the way to promote 
growth is to maintain inequality stationary, no matter how high or low it is, even with 
the assumption that growth does not have any distributional effects. It is also implied by 
the inverted “U” shape of the relationship that the optimal growth rate can be achieved 
at any level of inequality as long as this is fixed and no distributive distortions arise. 
 
The purpose of this section is twofold; first, to demonstrate the fact that the main 
variable determining the effects of inequality over growth is inequality itself, 
specifically, the level of inequality is the one determining the sign of the relationship; 
second, to prove the existence of an Optimal Rate of Inequality (ORI) in which growth 
is optimized and the economy is liberated from the negative effects of high inequality 
and/or high taxation. Additionally, this research proposes the existence of an inequality 
trap in which countries with low marginal efficiency of redistribution and 
underdeveloped tax systems are unable to reach the ORI and achieve optimal growth. 
This inequality trap can, in theory, account for the inability of some countries to lower 
the levels of inequality and/or generate significant growth. 
 
This chapter is structured as follows: on the following section a simple political 
economy model is presented to depict the relationship between redistribution, inequality 
and growth; the next section develops an empirical study composed by a broad panel of 
countries over four decades in order to test the non linear relationship; this study is 
follow by an alternative validation of the model trough the Kuznets curve;  It follows a 
third empirical study, this one consisting in a highly disaggregated, country specific, 
study that will empirically test for the validity of the model in the context of the 
Mexican economy; finally, a bibliometric study is presented with the purpose of 
providing empirical evidence to demonstrate that the proposed relationship between 
inequality and growth holds for most empirical studies when analyzing the composition 
of the sample.  
 
8 
 
The model 
 
Consider an economy in which the level of inequality is determined by the amount of 
redistribution. Higher levels of redistribution will lead to lower levels of inequality 
conditioned to the marginal efficiency of redistribution (MER) which is defined by the 
level of development of the tax system both on the revenue as in the redistributive 
expenditure side. An efficient redistributive system in which institutions and social 
programs are able to transfer resources effectively to the lower brackets of income, as 
well as a progressive tax system with low levels of evasion and informality, will result 
in a higher MER, in other words, higher changes in the levels of inequality as a 
response to changes in redistribution.  Additionally, this situation will result in a lower 
value relation between inequality and redistribution, where lower levels of redistribution 
will be enough to achieve a lower level of inequality in comparison to an economy with 
a less developed tax system. 
 
In this economy there is a tradeoff between the negative effects of high inequality (and 
low redistribution) and the negative effects of too much redistribution (and high 
taxation) on economic performance. High levels of inequality affect directly and 
indirectly the determinants of growth through its effects on investment, human capital, 
fertility and other variables that distort the potential of the economy. On the opposite 
side, high levels of redistribution and the associated high levels of taxation, also affect 
economic growth6 by discouraging economic agents to pursue productive activities, by 
limiting the accumulation of productive capital, by restraining investment due to 
elevated taxation and by preventing individuals from the appropriation of the returns of 
their productive activities Persson and Tabellini (1994). 
 
The economy tends to the concentration of income and higher levels of inequality (Sen 
1992). In this sense, constant redistribution is needed in order to maintain or reduce the 
levels of inequality in the economy. 
 
The previous arguments derive into three possible scenarios: 
 
                                                 
6 Castelló-Climent (2001) shows that the relationship between taxes on capital and growth rates behave as 
an inverted U, initially, capital taxation incentivizes growth, but after a certain level it starts generating 
negative effects over growth. 
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1. An economy with high levels of inequality and low redistribution that affect 
negatively the growth rate (y2 in upper part of Figure 1). 
2. An economy with low levels of inequality and high redistribution and taxation 
that affect negatively the growth rate (y1 in upper part of Figure 1). 
3. An economy with a level of inequality and redistribution in which both effects 
(the negative of high inequality and the negative of high redistribution) are 
minimized and the economic performance is released from any distortion to its 
growth potential. We will call this the optimal rate of inequality (ORI). At this 
level, the growth rate of the economy will be maximized in comparison to any 
other level of inequality (y* in upper part of Figure 1). . 
 
At the optimal rate of inequality, any change in the level of redistribution and 
inequality, positive or negative, will lead to a lower rate of economic growth. 
Nevertheless, lowering inequality will result in a positive relationship between 
inequality and growth as it will mean that in order to increase the growth rate to its 
maximum (and return it to the ORI) more inequality, and less redistribution/taxation 
which is the one affecting growth, will be needed (See Figure 1).  
 
Accordingly, if a country is at the ORI and its levels of inequality rise, the empirical 
relationship between inequality and growth will turn negative, meaning that in order to 
maximize the growth rate, a reduction in the level of inequality (a rise in redistribution) 
will be needed. This means that when a country reaches the ORI (the maximum in the 
kinked relationship) the correlation between inequality and growth will become 
insignificant (with a slope cero and negative second derivative). 
 
The intensity of the relationship between inequality and growth, in any direction, will be 
indicative of the distance of the current level of inequality from the ORI, the farther 
away from it, the stronger the relationship. 
 
It is important to point out that this model does not explain how much will the economy 
grow at different levels of inequality. That is the job of conventional growth models. 
What it shows is that, ceteris paribus, there are certain levels of inequality that affect 
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negatively the growth determinants in the economy and that there is a level of inequality 
that releases the potential of the economy, liberating it from any distortion from 
inequality or redistribution and maximizing the growth rate.  
 
 
Figure 1: The optimal rate of inequality and the relationship between 
redistribution, inequality and growth.  
 
 
 
The objective for a country should be to identify and reach the level of inequality that is 
empirically unrelated to growth. Once the ORI is reached there is no reason for moving 
away from it. The exception case would be a country in which the redistributive system 
(in the revenue and expenditure side) is highly underdeveloped and the level of taxation 
and redistribution necessary for maintaining the ORI needs to be very high. In this case, 
there could be a situation in which the negative effects of such level of taxation are 
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higher than the positive effects of being at the ORI. Nevertheless, this situation is highly 
improbable due to the impossibility for a country to reach the ORI under those 
conditions. 
 
In this model, growth does not have an automatic redistributive effect. Only through 
redistributive decisions can inequality be lowered. It is logical to assume that higher 
growth could translate into higher tax revenues that can increase the levels of 
redistribution, but only as the result of active redistributive policy implementation. 
 
Marginal Efficiency of Redistribution  
 
In this model, redistribution is defined ambiguously as the process of gathering 
resources (taxation) and allocating them at the lowest brackets of income (redistributive 
expenditure). This means that the decisions of lowering or increasing income inequality 
are affected both by the efficiency of the tax revenue system and of the redistributive 
expenditure programs. 
 
A more efficient redistributive system, in which resources are effectively allocated to 
the lowest brackets of income in the way of monetary and in kind transfers, access to 
education, health and other determinants of income homogeneity will result in a higher 
MER, this is, a higher elasticity in the effects on inequality levels as a response to a 
change on redistribution, graphically represented as a steeper curve.  
 
As an economy increases the MER, it will be easier to reach the optimal rate of 
inequality because less redistributive effort will be necessary to achieve significant 
changes in the level of income inequality.  
 
The other determinant of the slope of the relationship between inequality and 
redistribution is the level of development of the distributive system on the revenue side. 
A country with a developed and progressive tax system in which the principles of 
vertical and horizontal justice are fulfilled7, where evasion is minimized and informal 
                                                 
7 Broadly speaking, vertical justice in the context of taxation means that different incomes pay 
progressively different taxes. Horizontal justice means that individuals in a same income level should pay 
the same amount of taxes. 
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economy is very small, will tend to have more developed and efficient redistributive 
programs. Additionally, for each level of redistribution there will be a lower level of 
inequality associated to it, in comparison to a country with a less developed tax system.  
 
A country with high levels of evasion, informality and an inefficient tax collection 
system will require higher tax rates in order to obtain the same revenues as a country 
with a more developed tax system. This means that, for a country with a less developed 
tax system, more redistributive effort (on the revenue side) will be needed in order to 
achieve the same levels of inequality as an economy with a more developed system. 
 
Empirically, the arguments presented before explain the following situations faced by 
countries in their redistributive efforts: 
 
• The reason why different countries have different levels of inequality at similar 
levels of redistribution. 
• The reason why some countries with similar levels of inequality have different 
levels of redistribution and taxation. 
• The reason why some countries have to apply more intense redistributive 
policies than others in order to reduce inequality in depth. 
 
A note on the causality between income inequality and redistribution 
 
It is important to point out that in this model the causality of the relationship between 
inequality and redistribution is one sided. Changes in the level of inequality do not 
generate any significant effect on the levels of redistribution as some political economy 
models predict. For this to happen it would be necessary for a country to fulfill a series 
of assumptions such as perfect distribution of political power on the society (one person 
one vote), perfectly progressive tax systems, among other conditions in order for the 
median voter theorem to work.  
 
Additionally, this mechanism stresses the negative effects of redistribution over growth 
such as the distortions generated by high taxation or time loss in the bargaining process 
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of political decisions, without accounting for the potentially positive results from public 
investment and expenditure in activities such as education, R&D, health, infrastructure, 
among others. At best, it assumes the negative effects to overcome the positive ones. 
 
Assuming an automatic effect from inequality to redistribution would imply imposing 
an unrealistic ambiguity between the variables in both causal directions: one with a 
positive relationship from the effects of inequality over redistribution; and two, with a 
negative correlation from the effects of redistribution to inequality.  
 
If it were the case of a country in which this assumptions were confirmed, the predicted 
positive effect from inequality to redistribution would entail that a “curative” 
mechanism is permanently at work to prevent movements in redistribution and 
inequality, implying the existence of an equilibrium which irremediably leads to 
question how can, in this perspective, any country get out from to their initial inequality 
level? and how can it be affirmed that a country with high inequality will grow less if 
the mechanism itself prevents inequality from growing? Under this view, the cases of 
countries with high inequality, used to explain the political economy models, are in fact 
exceptions to the precepts of the model. 
 
Finally, several studies support these affirmations in that there is no convincing 
evidence to support the statement that inequality affects positively redistribution 
(Rodriguez, 2000; Benabou, 1996; Bertola, 2000; García-Peñalosa, and Turnovsky, 
2006; Josten, 2003). Benabou (1996) affirms that “the effect of income distribution on 
transfers and taxes is rarely significant, and its sign varies from one study or even one 
specification to the other”.  
 
 
The inequality trap 
 
Consider a worst case scenario in which there is a country with a very low marginal 
efficiency of redistribution and a highly underdeveloped tax system. This country is 
characterized by having low tax revenue due to high evasion and a large informal sector 
in the economy. Additionally, the redistributive system is highly inefficient; the 
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resources are poorly allocated and any redistributive effort yields very low effects on 
the levels of income inequality. In consequence, this country sustains high levels of 
income inequality that distort the determinants of economic growth and limit the 
potential of the economy (See Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2: Underdeveloped redistributive systems and the inequality 
trap. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Given these circumstances, this country would find itself facing an inequality trap in 
which any effort to reach the ORI would be insufficient. The level of redistribution 
needed in order to reach the optimum will be too high to achieve and it would mean 
additional distortion to the economy8.  
 
Any country that finds itself in this situation will not be able to reach the ORI with a 
distributive strategy. In order to achieve the desired level of income inequality, first, it 
would be necessary to develop the conditions for a higher marginal efficiency of 
redistribution and a more developed tax revenue system. Achieving this will result in 
lower levels of inequality with the same or even inferior levels of taxation and 
redistribution. 
 
                                                 
8 In this example it would mean extremely high tax rates to the few contributors who pay. This elevated 
taxation could be interpreted as incentives to evade or to disengage from productive activities, resulting in 
even less revenue for the government. 
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A practical implication of this example is that a country determined to reach the ORI 
should be aware that increasing redistribution is not the only way to reach the desired 
level of inequality and economic growth. The first strategy for lowering income 
inequality should be to make sure that the redistributive system (both on the revenue as 
in the redistributive expenditure side) is fully developed, this will automatically 
generate two results: 
 
1. A reduction in the level of income inequality as the value relation between 
redistribution and growth will decrease automatically. 
2. More efficient redistributive policies that will yield better results in further 
lowering the levels of income inequality and approaching them to the ORI. 
 
A country characterized by having poorly developed redistributive systems, both on the 
revenue as in the expenditure side, should be aware of the tradeoff they face in their 
decisions of moving inequality levels towards the ORI. Not only they are in a situation 
in which they could face an inequality trap that will prevent them from reaching the 
ORI but they will probably generate additional distortions to the economy derived from 
the higher taxes needed for the required redistribution levels. 
 
A note on the relationship between this model and other non-linear propositions 
 
Before proceeding to the empirical test of the model, it is necessary to clear out the fact 
that the above described model differs substantially from the, also non-linear, 
relationship supported by some authors (Barro, 2000; Pagano, 2004; Voitchovsky, 
2005; Bengoa and Sanchez-Robles, 2005; Barro, 2008; Castello-Climent, 2010), even 
though readers might incorrectly assume some similarities.  
 
First it is necessary to recall the fact that the core proposition of the kinked non-linear 
type of models is that inequality depicts a negative relationship with growth in low 
income countries and a positive one in high income countries9. This way, the income 
                                                 
9 Refer to the introduction for a broader explanation of this relationship. 
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level is the determinant factor for the inequality-growth relationship, as the income level 
determined its rate of growth or reduction for a given inequality level. 
 
In this sense, the overall relationship presented in this research could be compatible 
only under the following circumstances: 
 
- That as countries increase their income levels, they also increase their 
redistribution levels (several country cases such as the United States 
demonstrate this is not an empirical regularity), or that they do so, after a certain 
income level10. 
- Given the prior; that the increasing redistribution will effectively lower the 
inequality levels as the economy grows. Implying a redistributive/taxation 
system that become more efficient (developed) as the economies grow. 
 
These conditions imply the existence of an automatic growth Æ redistribution Æ lower 
inequality, mechanism which is the equivalent to affirming that economic growth leads 
automatically to economic development. 
 
Accounting the income level as the main determinant of the inequality-growth 
relationship may imply assuming too many things that may not occur. Additionally, the 
income level will never cease to be relative to the ones existing at a specific time. The 
determination of a rich country in terms of its income will always be subject to the 
income of one’s regarding others and, thus, to what happens individually in those 
economies but in comparison to the others. Maybe this is why the income break point in 
Barro (2000) differs so much from the one found in Barro (2008), around $2,000 (in 
1980 US dollars) to $11,900 (in 2000 US dollars), when the first would have a value of 
approximately $3,245 if expressed in 2000 US dollars, a difference of almost four times 
the income between each other. Perhaps what happened was that in the 2008 sample the 
countries situated around the optimal rate of inequality had a higher income than those 
in the 2000 sample. Also, the reason for the negative and statistically significant overall 
                                                 
10 This includes an additional side assumption in the sense that redistribution will be progressive; while 
there is evidence in the sense that less developed countries might be prone to have progressive taxation. 
(i.e. Bertola, 2000 and Scott, 2009). 
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relationship found in Barro (2008) between inequality and growth derives from the fact 
that in 2008 there were more countries with inequality levels above the ORI. 
 
The core idea on the model developed in this research is that different levels of 
inequality will exert specific effects on the growth rates, at any income level. Any 
country that can reach the optimal rate of inequality11, regardless of its income level or 
its “richness” in comparison to other countries, will release its growth determinants 
from the distortions of either high inequality or high taxation. In this sense, inequality is 
a far more useful measure, as its value can be reliably estimated and delimited (in a 
scale of 0 to 1 in the case of the Gini coefficient), additionally, it does not suffer from 
the relativity issues that the per capita GDP has to face. 
 
Finally, and in a more philosophical perspective, the question which try to answer most 
of the previous studies on the effects from income inequality to economic growth, 
specifically: Is inequality bad or good for growth?, might be incorrectly stated. 
Furthermore, the answer provided in the case of the income dependent non-linear 
relationship, namely, inequality is bad for the poor and good for the rich, defies some 
of the basic foundations of any society, which rely on the existence of inequalities in the 
form of economic and social differentiation of individuals and in the incentives for 
achieving such differentiation.  
 
Competence of this model in forecasting growth 
 
As mentioned before, it is beyond the service of this model to provide a forecast on the 
growth rates of the economies, nor to forecast which will be the richest ones based 
solely on their inequality levels. The economic performance and the amount of growth 
of the countries are fundamentally determined by the variables known to be responsible 
of the economic cycle and production possibilities within a country and between them. 
Capital (K), labor (L), human capital (H), technology (T) and perhaps other variables, 
are the ones responsible for the production levels and productivity of a country.  
 
                                                 
11 Later it will be proven that the ORI is at reasonably intermediate levels of inequality, at a Gino value of 
about .39. 
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The arguments of the model presented above imply that there is an optimal rate (or 
range) of income inequality which effectively liberates the growth determinants from 
the distortions of either high levels of inequality or of excessively low inequality levels, 
through the different mechanisms previously discussed in the theoretical framework.  
 
From this, it is plausible to affirm that the model has much relationship not only with 
the nominal growth rates of countries but also with their potential growth. A country 
with higher (or lower) than optimal income inequality levels will see its growth 
determinants restrained from performing at their potential level, thus it will be 
impossible to reach its potential growth rate, regardless of the nominal growth rate it 
achieves. Contrastingly, a country with optimal income inequality levels will be able to 
grow at its potential rates of growth, or at least closer to them in comparison to other 
less egalitarian economies, regardless of its nominal growth rate or the fact that it could 
be lower to that of the previously exemplified country.  
 
Consider the example of three countries (A, B and C) with nominal growth rates of ΔYA 
> ΔYB > ΔYC at a specific moment in time and inequality levels of GA > GB* > GC. 
Income inequality in country B* is situated at optimal levels; at a higher than optimal 
level in country A and lower than optimal in country C. Finally, potential growth rates 
are PΔYB>PΔYC>PΔYA. Potential growth is defined as the growth rate at which the 
economy would growth if there were no distortions to the growth determinants.  
 
At any point in time, country A would have a nominal growth rate higher than those of 
countries B and C, derived from the specific circumstances of that country, such as 
capital accumulation, stock of human capital, technology, etc. Nevertheless, derived 
from the fact that the growth determinants in country A are distorted to some degree by 
the higher than optimal levels of inequality, the nominal growth rate will be lower than 
the potential growth rate (ΔYA < PΔYA). Accordingly, the nominal growth rate of 
country C will be also lower than its potential growth rate (ΔYB < PΔYB) and at a lower 
nominal rate than A, however, if country C could reach optimal levels of inequality its 
growth rate would be higher than A12. (See figure 3) 
 
                                                 
12 Assuming that country B does not improve its inequality levels. 
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Finally, country B grows at a lower nominal rate compared to A and C, nevertheless, its 
nominal equals its potential growth rate derived from the fact that the economy’s 
inequality level is at the optimal rate and there are no distortions to its growth 
determinants, regardless of their levels.  
 
The workings of this predictions are subject to the assumption that there are no other 
forces restraining the growth determinants, nevertheless it allows to affirm that the 
overall empirical tendency should depict a general kinked non linear relationship 
between nominal growth rates and income inequality (especially when controlling for 
the specific effects of the growth determinants), as it can be expected that countries 
achieving higher potential growth will eventually also reach the conditions for 
performing at the higher nominal growth rates. However, when graphically represented, 
it is expected to depict a significant degree of dispersion in the data, as the simple two 
variable correlations will be affected by the differences in level of the growth 
determinants. 
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Figure 3: The nominal and potential growth rate in relation to the 
optimal rate of inequality 
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Empirical evidence 
 
The following section addresses empirically the main propositions of this paper, 
namely: 
 
• The existence of a negative relationship between redistribution and 
inequality. 
• The existence of a non linear relationship between inequality and growth, 
with a negative relationship at high levels of inequality that attenuates as 
inequality is reduced, until it turns positive at low levels of inequality. 
• The existence of a level of inequality that maximizes the growth rate of the 
economy. 
 
Data   
 
Inequality data measured by the GINI coefficient is similar to the one used by Barro 
(2008) which was compiled from the United Nations World Income Inequality Database 
(WIID) and complemented by additional high quality observations from the Deininger 
& Squire database. The original data before filtering covered 138 countries for the 
period of 1960 – 2000 with a total of 595 observations. At the end, the availability and 
correspondence of data for inequality and the dependant variable resulted in a sample of 
112 countries with at least one combination of observations. Four additional ex-
communist economies were excluded, leaving a total of 108 countries. 
 
The dependant variable was obtained from the Penn World Table mark 6.3 and is 
expressed in international 2005 prices. The variable was calculated as the average 
growth rate of per capita GDP for each decade; the four periods (70, 80, 90 and 2000) 
were calculated averaging the values around each of the four period years so for the 
1970`s the values from the years 1965 to 1975 were averaged, and so on for the 
following periods. The data for initial GDP per capita and the investment ratio were 
calculated from the Penn World Table 6.3. 
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Total fertility rate (TFR) was compiled from the Barro and Lee (1993) dataset for the 
period 1960 -1985 in five year intervals and complemented with information from the 
United Nations data system (UNdata) for the years 1990 and 2000. Life expectancy at 
birth was also extracted from the Barro and Lee (1993) dataset but complemented by 
information from the World Bank world databank. The sum of secondary and tertiary 
total school attainment was obtained from the new Barro and Lee (2010) dataset on 
educational attainment. 
 
A fundamental variable in the model is the measure for redistribution which originally 
was intended to be captured by the ratio of government expenditure on health plus 
education over GDP. Unfortunately, due to data unavailability it was impossible to 
capture this information for all periods and it was decided to employ only the ratio of 
education expenditure over GDP. The raw data came from the Barro-Lee dataset and 
was complemented by data from the UNdata system13 
 
Finally, tax revenue expressed as percentage of GDP was obtained in order to use as 
proxy for discriminating between countries with developed and underdeveloped tax 
revenue systems. Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the main variables. 
 
The model specification is of the following type: 
 
∆Y ൌ βଵ ൅ βଶGini୧ ൅ β୧Gini୧
ଶ ൅ β୧X୧ ൅ ε 
 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of main variables 
  
Definition  Source    Year  Mean  Max.  Min.  Std. Dev.  Obs.
Investment 
Ratio 
Ratio of real domestic 
investment (private 
pus public) to real 
GDP 
Barro & 
Leea 
1960 0.17 0.44 0.01 0.10 105 
1970 0.18 0.40 0.02 0.10 107 
1980 0.18 0.39 0.01 0.09 108 
1990 0.18 0.41 0.02 0.09 108 
2000 0.19 0.46 0.04 0.10 108 
           
Inequality Inequality measured 
by the GINI 
coefficient 
Barro 1960 .4397 .6410 .1890 .1061 66 
1970 .4261 .6820 .2370 .988 74 
1980 .4110 .6370 .2240 .998 80 
1990 .4456 .7730 .2370 .1119 97 
2000 .4147 .5986 .2370 .1013 64 
                                                 
13 Data from the UNdata system were obtained expressed as percentages. Because of this it was necessary 
to divide each figure by 100 in order to make it comparable with the rest of the data. 
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Redistribution Ratio of education 
expenditure over GDP 
Barro & 
Leea / 
UNdata 
 1960-65 0.03 0.06 0.01 0.01 95 
 1970-75 0.04 0.37 0.01 0.04 83 
 1980-85 0.05 0.42 0.01 0.04 90 
 1990-95 0.04 0.09 0.01 0.02 87 
 2000-04 0.05 0.11 0.01 0.02 90 
           
Fertility Total Fertility Rate Barro & 
Leea / 
UNdata 
1960 1.66 2.08 0.71 0.37 101 
1970 1.57 2.08 0.60 0.42 101 
1980 1.42 2.08 0.36 0.52 101 
1990 1.27 2.09 0.26 0.54 106 
2000 1.11 2.03 0.18 0.53 106 
           
Income Ln of real GDP per 
capita expressed in 
2005 international 
prices  
Penn 
W.T. 
Mark 6.3 
1955 8.16 9.64 6.33 0.85 66 
1965 8.07 9.95 6.18 0.98 101 
1975 8.34 10.12 6.43 1.03 107 
1985 8.46 10.34 6.39 1.11 107 
1995 8.57 10.81 6.41 1.22 108 
           
PPPI Price level of 
investment. PPP of 
investment over 
exchange rate relative 
to the U.S. 
 Penn 
W.T. 
Mark 6.3 
 1970 69.05 362.99 13.79 51.41 107 
  1980 112.55 1707.9 19.96 169.19 107 
  1990 81.66 472.55 16.35 62.02 108 
  2000 64.58 315.65 19.08 39.95 108 
           
Education Sum of secondary 
plus tertiary total 
school attainment 
 Barro & 
Leeb 
 1965 0.88 4.57 0.00 0.92 100 
  1975 1.32 5.82 0.03 1.16 100 
  1985 1.86 6.25 0.07 1.31 100 
  1995 2.40 6.38 0.10 1.50 100 
  2000 2.62 7.07 0.12 1.58 100 
           
GDP Growth Average GDP per 
capita growth 
expressed in 2005 
international prices 
 Penn 
W.T. 
Mark 6.3 
 1960 2.68 15.67 -4.95 3.00 101 
  1970 2.79 14.78 -7.13 2.59 107 
  1980 1.26 7.14 -4.91 2.44 107 
  1990 1.44 8.03 -6.53 2.29 108 
  2000 1.89 7.55 -5.47 1.99 108 
 
 
Results 
 
A first set of estimations were performed using the complete sample, in order to 
demonstrate the argument of a negative relationship between inequality and 
redistribution. Table 2 reports the results. Initially (equation 1), a linear regression with 
only redistribution as explicative variable was carried out. As expected, a strong and 
significantly negative coefficient that confirms the effects of redistribution over 
inequality levels.  
 
Several dummy variables were included in order to increase the explanatory power of 
the estimation, inspired by the ones employed by Barro (2008), such as Asia and Latina 
America and dummies that register the characteristics of the data sources for computing 
inequality such as being from households or individuals or measured as income or 
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expenditure. An additional dummy, which reflected if captured income was gross of net 
of taxes, was included in the estimations. 
 
Equations 3 to 5 report the results. When including only the regional dummies (equation 
3) it was found a still strongly negative and significant effect of redistribution over 
growth, although slightly lower (-110.35 vs. -143.73) perhaps derived from the fact that 
the dummies account (especially Latin America) for a lower efficiency of the 
redistributive efforts in their economy, regardless from the absolute level of 
redistribution. As in Barro (2008), the signs for the dummies were positive and 
significant; nevertheless, the Asian dummy had a lower coefficient and was barely 
significant at the 5%, while the L.A. dummy had a coefficient twice higher and 
significant at the 1%. 
 
Equation 4 depicts the results of adding the dummies that capture the characteristics of 
the data used to construct the Gini coefficients. The regression shows a higher 
explanatory power (the average R2 for the system is .38 while for equations 1 and 3 was 
.07 and .26) and the coefficient for redistribution maintained its significance and a 
highly negative value (-123.71).  
 
An additional system (Equation 5) was estimated including the three before mentioned 
variables plus the Latin American dummy. The results of this equation confirm once 
again the proposition of a strong negative and significant effect of redistribution over 
inequality levels. Furthermore, the coefficients also corroborate the fact that individual 
instead of household income information tends to compute higher Gini values 
(Deininger and Squire, 1996), especially when the dataset is mainly constructed with 
data from low and medium income countries where families tend to have more 
members. Gross income information (instead of net) tends to show lower inequality 
coefficients as it does not account for fiscal redistribution. 
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 Table 2. Redistribution vs. Inequality 
  Complete sample 
Variables / Equations 1 2 3 4 5 
Redistribution -143.73 -168.96 -110.35 -123.71 -123.55 
 (0.0006) (0.0000) (0.0033) (0.0053) (0.0032) 
Dummy: Latin America   10.98  7.31 
   (0.000)  (0.0001) 
Dummy: Asia   4.78   
   (0.0498)   
Dummy: Household vs. 
Individual     9.63 6.42 
    (0.0000) (0.0004) 
Dummy: Gross or net income    -10.28 -6.77 
    (0.0000) (0.0019) 
Dummy: Income or 
expenditure data    -9.19 -8.53 
        (0.0005) (0.0003) 
Dummy: Development of tax 
(revenue) system   -3.77       
  (0.0164)    
Dummy: Marginal efficiency 
of redistribution  -5.64    
    (0.0004)       
Intercepts 47.6, 48.2, 51.0, 47.1 
51.9, 52.2, 
55.6, 52.1 
43.4,43.4, 
46.4,41.7 
53.6,54.2, 
57.8,55.0 
51.1,51.3, 
54.9,51.7 
Number of Observations 70, 66, 81, 55 
65, 62, 73, 
50 
70, 66, 81, 
55 
39, 39, 43, 
28 
39, 39, 43, 
28 
R-squared 0.08, 0.02, 0.05, 0.13 
0.11, 0.11, 
0.18, 0.30 
0.16, 0.16, 
0.16, 0.58 
0.16,0.37, 
0.40, 0.60 
0.32,0.47, 
0.47, 0.69 
 
Dependant variable: Inequality measured by the Gini coefficient. Estimation made by the seemingly 
unrelated regression (SUR) technique. T-Statistics probability in parenthesis. Explanatory variables 
are: Latin American dummy, Asia dummy, a dummy that is equal 1 when the inequality data is 
collected from the person and 0 if from the household (Household vs. Individual), a dummy that 
reports whether the income registered is gross = 0 or net = 1 of taxes, a dummy that captures whether 
the Gini coefficient is calculated based on income = 1 or expenditure = 0, A dummy that reports if a 
country has a developed =1 or under developed tax (revenue) system = 0, finally, a dummy that 
captures whether the country has  a High = 1 or low = 0 marginal efficiency of redistribution.  
 
 
Finally, contrary to predicted by D & S, the dummy that captures whether data comes 
from income rather than from expenditure has a negative sign, which means that this 
kind of information tends to result in a lower Gini value, perhaps capturing some degree 
of regressive redistribution in the gross of the sample observations.  
 
An inverse estimation was also performed (not shown) where Gini and redistribution 
variables were shifted in order to look for a reverse causality between the variables. As 
expected, the coefficient of the Gini variable turned to be almost cero (-0.0002), proving 
empirically an almost nonexistent effect from inequality to redistribution. 
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It has been proven that redistribution has a clear effect over inequality levels; 
nevertheless, not every redistributive effort has the same effect on lowering inequality. 
A country trying to reach the optimal rate of inequality (ORI) will need to define the 
necessary levels of redistribution based on how far they are from the ORI, but more 
importantly, on the efficiency of the redistributive system in reducing inequality. Table 
3 reports the results of dividing the sample into countries with low and high levels of 
development of the redistributive system in order to verify the statement that in 
economies where the efficiency of redistribution is low, the marginal efficiency of 
redistribution (MER) will be sensibly lower in comparison to countries with highly 
efficient redistributive systems. 
 
The measure for the development of the redistributive system was approximated using a 
proxy that measures the efficiency of one of the most important manifestations of 
redistribution, namely, expenditure on education. This was obtained by dividing the 
gross enrolment ratio for primary and secondary education over the ratio of education 
expenditure over GDP (results/amount). The variable allowed differentiating between 
countries with low and high efficiency in their redistributive systems. The criterion for 
dividing the sample was fairly arbitrary, taking as reference the average from the 
minimum and maximum values as start/end point14.  
 
Two key results are worth noticing; first, the difference in the intensity of the coefficient 
for the variable redistribution is quite notable for both samples, especially when 
including only redistribution as explanatory variable, in this case, the value is 57% 
higher in the elevated MER sample than the one in the low MER sample (-214.35 
against -136.1); second, the intercepts on the system estimation with the high MER are, 
on average, lower than the ones in the estimation for the low MER sample (3.31% 
lower). These tendencies maintain when incorporating some of the variables used in 
Table 2, always obtaining higher coefficients for redistribution in the sample with the 
higher MER. 
 
 
 
                                                 
14 For the high quality sample it was necessary to insert additional observation with lower values in order 
to make a more robust estimation.  
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Table 3. Redistribution vs. Inequality: segmented sample 
 
  
High Marginal efficiency of 
redistribution 
Low Marginal efficiency of 
redistribution 
Variables / Equations 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Redistribution -214.35 -130.39 -115.35 -136.1 -106.24 -112.35 
 (0.0000) (0.0125) (0.0323) (0.0054) (0.0628) (0.0351) 
Dummy: Household vs. 
Individual   13.19 12.3  12.54 9.93 
  (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Dummy: Gross or net 
income  -6.11 -9.88  -4.73 -10.45 
  (0.004) (0.0001)  (0.0335) (0.0001) 
Dummy: Income or 
expenditure data   -11.9   -9.62 
      (0.0004)     (0.0009) 
Intercepts 47.2, 47.3, 49.9, 49.0 
43.2, 42.9, 
47.0, 45.2 
54.5, 54.1, 
57.4, 56.3 
49.0, 50.0, 
52.5, 48.0 
42.7, 43.5, 
46.8, 42.5 
53.2, 54.1, 
57.1, 53.8 
Number of Observations 
45, 42, 48, 
41 
27, 27, 29, 
22 
25, 25, 27, 
21 
44, 43, 53, 
29 
25, 26, 30, 
18 
25, 26, 30, 
18 
R-squared 0.17, 0.07, 0.20, 0.22 
0.14, 0.38, 
0.43, 0.63 
0.14, 0.43, 
0.6, 0.67 
0.10, 0.03, 
0.04, 0.14 
0.11, 0.31, 
0.23, 0.62 
0.27, 0.38, 
0.38, 0.68  
Dependant variable: Inequality measured by the Gini coefficient; estimation made by Seemingly Unrelated 
Regression (SUR) technique. Independent variables are: Latin American dummy, Asia dummy, a dummy that is 
equal 1 when the inequality data is collected from the person and 0 if from the household (Household vs. 
Individual), a dummy that reports whether the income registered is gross =0 or net = 1 of taxes, a dummy that 
captures whether the Gini coefficient is calculated based on income = 1 or expenditure = 0, 
 
These results confirm that having a more developed and efficient redistributive system 
will result not only in higher marginal effects of the redistributive efforts in reducing 
inequality15, but also in a lower value relation between inequality and growth (see 
Figure 4) so that that any given level of redistribution (inequality) will be associated 
with a lower level of inequality (redistribution). 
 
As mentioned before, the relationship between redistribution and inequality is also 
determined by the level of development of the tax system on its revenue side. A country 
with high levels of evasion, informality and an inefficient tax collection system will 
require higher nominal tax rates in order to obtain the same revenues as a country with a 
more developed tax system and more redistributive effort (on the revenue side) will be 
needed in order to achieve the same levels of inequality as an economy with a 
developed tax system.  
 
                                                 
15 Notice that the position of the variables (inequality and redistribution) in the graphs has been inverted 
in order to fit the overall model relating this relationship to the inequality-growth correlation; this is why 
it would seem that a higher marginal efficiency of redistribution should have a lower coefficient in order 
to be more efficient in reducing inequality. 
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Table 4 details the results of several estimations for a sub-sample of countries with the 
highest levels of tax revenue measured as percentage of its GDP. As anticipated, the 
coefficient for redistribution is in all cases higher than in the general sample. In 
equation 1, were redistribution is the only independent variable; the coefficient is 68% 
higher than the same system in the general sample estimation (see Table 1, equation 1). 
 
The tendency remains when including the other variables; both the geographical and the 
data characteristics dummies do not affect the strong negative coefficient in the 
estimations and they depict a higher value in comparison to the general sample, 
particularly when including the data characteristics dummies. 
 
When comparing the results of Tables 3 and 4 we find that the effects of having a more 
developed and efficient tax revenue system has stronger effects on reducing inequality 
than the development of the redistributive system itself, perhaps because there is a 
strong causal relationship from the first to the latter. The more developed the tax system 
is on the revenue side, more resources can be intended for redistribution and there will 
be a higher probability of having a developed tax system on the expenditure side. 
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Figure 4: Marginal efficiency of redistribution and its effects on the 
inequality-redistribution relationship 
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Table 4. Redistribution vs. Inequality (b): segmented sample 
  Highly developed tax system 
Variables / Equations 1 2 3 4 
Redistribution -242.07 -162.11 -186.85 -182.29 
 (0.0003) (0.0072) (0.0048) (0.0025) 
Dummy: Latin America  11.18  7.01 
  (0.0000)  (0.0003) 
Dummy: Asia  6.64   
  (0.0968)   
Dummy: Household vs. 
Individual    9.09 7.31 
   (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Dummy: Gross or net 
income   -8.43 -5.06 
   (0.0002) (0.009) 
Dummy: Income or 
expenditure data   -10.28 -7.67 
      (0.0002) (0.0006) 
Intercepts 50.6, 51.7, 55.5, 49.5 
45.1, 44.7, 
48.4, 42.2 
55.0, 56.8, 
61.2, 56.5 
50.2, 51.4, 
56.1, 50.7 
Number of Observations 38, 36, 44, 31 38, 36, 44, 31 20, 21, 24, 18 20, 21, 24, 18 
R-squared 0.17, 0.06, 0.05, 0.13 
0.21, 0.22, 
0.12, 0.58 
0.39, 0.48, 
0.56, 0.68 
0.50, 0.59, 
0.54, 0.81 
Variables identical to table 2 
 
 
The next step, after demonstrating the negative relationship between redistribution and 
inequality, was to test for the non linearity of the relationship between inequality and 
growth in order to validate the proposed model. Table 5 reports the results of an initial 
set of estimations via the Seemingly Unrelated Regression methodology where the Gini 
and its square value as well as other explanatory variables16 were included. 
 
Equation 1 initially demonstrates (in line with most studies based on the Deininger and 
Squire, 1996 complete dataset) the fact that the majority of the observations and 
correspondence between inequality and growth data of the complete sample are located 
on the negative range of the relationship. When including in this first estimation the 
Gini coefficient together with life expectancy and three religion dummies it was evident 
the negative overall relationship between inequality and growth. In this general case, a 
5% decrease in the Gini coefficient of would raise the GDP per capita growth rate in 
1.3%. 
 
                                                 
16 The variables included in the system had the objective of giving more explanatory power to the overall 
equation while trying to achieve non-endogeneity and low correlation with the Gini coefficient. 
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Equations 2 to 4 test for the non linearity between inequality and growth by 
incorporating the square value of the Gini coefficient. The estimation results show that 
the coefficients for both variables are significant, especially when introducing the Latin 
American dummy.  
 
The sign of the Gini coefficient is positive while the square Gini is negative, 
demonstrating the fact that at low levels of inequality (lower than the ORI) the 
relationship is positive, and at high levels of inequality, the relationship is negative.  
 
The level of inequality at which the relationship changes, is at an approximated Gini 
value of .39. At this level, the economy grows higher than at any other level. These 
results verify the existence of an optimal rate of inequality, at which the economy is 
released from any distortion from either high inequality or high taxation/redistribution 
(and low inequality).  
 
As expected, the reciprocal of life expectancy at birth as well as the religion dummies 
(Catholic, Protestant and Muslim) show a negative effect on growth rates. Equation 4 
includes the price level of investment as explanatory variable as a measure of price 
distortions in the economy, this variable appeared to account for some of the effects 
previously captured by the religion dummies and the reciprocal of life expectancy, 
while increasing the effects of both Gini and Gini2. 
 
Table 5. Inequality and growth relationship (SUR estimation) 
Variables / Equations 1 2 3 4 5 
Gini -0.022 0.10 0.13 0.15 -0.03 
 (0.036) (0.109) (0.05) (0.0200) (0.0283) 
Gini2  -0.001 -0.0016 -0.002  
  (0.049) (0.026) (0.012)  
Latin American dummy   -0.67 -0.8  
   (0.0448) (0.0169)  
1/life expectancy at birth -194.12 -182.61 -189.87 -162.41 -140.56 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0017) 
Catholic dummy -1.67 -1.59 -1.14 -0.97  
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.009) (0.0289)  
Protestant dummy -2.45 -2.27 -2.16 -1.71  
 (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0027)  
Muslim dummy -1.03 -1.05 -1.06 -1.02  
 (0.0164) (0.0139) (0.012) (0.0141)  
PPPI    -0.007  
    (0.0039)  
Gini x Redistribution     0.39 
          (0.0359) 
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Intercepts 8.4, 6.7, 6.8, 7.1 
5.6, 3.9, 
4.0, 4.3 
5.0, 3.2, 
3.4, 3.7 
4.6, 2.9, 
3.06, 3.4 
5.9, 4.2, 
4.5, 4.8 
Number of Observations 63, 69, 76, 92 
63, 69, 76, 
92 
63, 69, 76, 
92 
59, 67, 74, 
91 
42, 39, 51, 
69 
R-squared 0.3, 0.20, 0.25, 0.01 
0.3, 0.18, 
0.24, 0.07 
0.27, 0.17, 
0.27, 0.08 
0.33, 0.18, 
0.30, 0.08 
0.15, 0.1, 
0.1, 0.13 
 
Independent variable is average GDP growth for each 10 year period (70s,80s, 90s, and 00s). 
Estimation made by the Seemingly Unrelated Regression technique.  Explanatory variables are: 
Gini, Square Gini, Latin American dummy, the reciprocal of life expectancy at birth, three religion 
dummies that equals one if the majority of the population profess either Catholic, Protestant or 
Muslim religion, and the price level of investment (PPPI). Intercepts from equations 1-4 are 
significant at the 1 and 5 percent, the remaining are significant to the 1 percent. 
 
 
Equation 5 adds an interaction term between inequality measured by the Gini coefficient 
and redistribution in order to further validate the non-linearity of the relationship 
between inequality and growth. The results confirmed that at low levels of redistribution 
the relationship between inequality and growth is negative (because inequality will be 
high), but as redistribution increases, this relationship will attenuate and will eventually 
turn positive when reaching a level of redistribution equivalent to approximately 11% of 
GDP.  
 
An additional set of systems were estimated via 3SLS based on Barro (2008) in which 
economic indicators were included as explanatory variables. The potential endogeneity 
of some of the independent variables is addressed with a set of instruments that comply 
with the requirements of being correlated with the explanatory variables and not being 
correlated with the error term (see notes on Table 6). The three stage least squares 
(3SLS) estimator, proposed by Zellner and Theil (1962), considers the specific error 
term as random and provides asymptotical efficient estimations that come from 
exploiting nonzero cross equation covariation.17  
 
The systems incorporate typical explanatory variables employed in standard growth 
models such as the log of per capita GDP and the investment ratio. These level variables 
resulted in all cases as expected, the first one with a negative coefficient that confirm 
conditional convergence and the second one with a positive and significant one 
depicting the contribution of investment to GDP growth. 
 
                                                 
17 See Belsley (1988) for an analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of this econometric 
methodology. 
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The log of the total fertility rate shows negative effects on growth, although statistically 
significant to the 5% in most cases. The reciprocal of life expectancy at birth turned to 
be barely significant in the linear estimation (Equations 1 and 2), but when testing for 
non-linearity (Equations 3 to 6), it became statistically insignificant. The political 
instability variable, though surprisingly positive, has almost null effects on growth 
while total school attainment for secondary and tertiary education turned to be 
statistically insignificant.  
 
Equations 1 and 2 of Table 6 test for the overall effects of inequality over growth. The 
results are consistent with the ones in Equation 1 of Table 5. In this case, lowering 
inequality from a Gini level of .40 to .39 would increase the GDP per capita growth rate 
in 1.73%. This result and the fact that the average Gini for the four decades is .43 
demonstrate once again the fact that the sample as a whole is located predominantly in 
the negative spectrum of the relationship between inequality and growth. (see 
Appendixes 1 and 2) 
 
Equations 3 to 6 report the results of testing for the non linearity of the relationship 
between inequality and growth. This was verified initially by including the square value 
of the Gini coefficient. In all cases, a positive sign for the Gini coefficient and a 
negative one for its square value were found. Appendix 3 depicts the kinked non-linear 
relationship between inequality and growth computed with the coefficients of the 
regressions. 
 
As in the SUR estimation, is was found that at a Gini of .39 is the breakpoint where the 
growth rate is maximized and where the sign of the relationship changes Equation 4 
incorporates a dummy that accounts for the level of development of the tax system, as 
well as a dummy for Latin America in order to control for the effects of a tendency for 
some Latin American countries of having high inequality combined with high growth 
rates. Both variables turned to be statistically insignificant, nevertheless, when the price 
level of investment is included in Equation 5, the Latin American dummy turns 
statistically significant with a negative sign. Price distortions seem to capture whatever 
was making the L.A. dummy statistically insignificant. 
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Lastly, Equation 7 includes the interaction term between inequality and growth (Gini x 
Redistribution). Once again it was verified the fact that as redistribution increases, the 
relationship turns from being initially negative to positive, in this case, when reaching a 
level of redistribution equivalent to approximately 5.8% of GDP. This value is 
considerably lower than the one obtained in the SUR estimation, perhaps because 
Equation 5 of Table 5 did not include economic variables which could capture a portion 
of the effects of redistribution on inequality and ultimately on growth. 
 
Table 6. Inequality and growth relationship (3SLS estimation) 
Variables / Equations 1 2 3 4 5 6 7* 
Gini -0.04 -0.02 0.22 0.23 0.23 0.022 -0.06 
 (0.0341 (0.0502) (0.0076) (0.0045) (0.0044) (0.0074) (0.003) 
Gini2   -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003  
   (0.003) (0.0022) (0.002) (0.0023)  
Log(per capita GDP) -1.56 -1.48 -1.19 -1.39 -1.002 -1.11 -1.68 
 (0.0000 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Log(Total fertility rate) -1.67 -1.51 -1.61 -1.59 -1.27 -1.5 -2.07 
 (0.0253 (0.0153) (0.0151) (0.0179) (0.0515) (0.0212) (0.0062) 
1 / life expectancy at 
birth -166.11 -153.32 -89.58 -88.4 -108.5 -70.76  
 (0.0736) (0.0183) (0.1618) (0.2087) (0.1086) (0.2889)  
Investment ratio 7.89 4.46 6.12 8.52 5.78 6.63 9.37 
 (0.0023) (0.0419) (0.0038) (0.0001) (0.0043) (0.0013) (0.0017) 
Political instability 
variable 0.0086 0.01     0.007 
 (0.0015) (0.0005)     (0.0092) 
PPPI (Price level of 
investment)  0.001   -0.005 -0.002  
  (0.3748)   (0.1993) (0.5218)  
Secondary and tertiary 
school attainment  0.12      
  (0.3748)      
Dummy: developed tax 
revenue system    0.19    
    (0.4231)    
Dummy: Latin America    -0.28 -0.64   
    (0.3241) (0.0181)   
Gini x Redistribution       0.52 
              (0.006) 
Intercepts 21.1,19.6, 19.8,19.8 
19.8,18.3, 
18.1,18.0 
11.4,10.1, 
9.9,10.1 
12.2,10.8, 
10.9,10.9 
9.8,8.5, 
8.4,8.5 
10.4,9.1, 
9.0,9.1 
18.34,18.
6, 18.76 
Number of Observations 28,53,47, 49 
46,61,66, 
82 
46,62,69, 
87 
45,58,65, 
82 
46,62,69, 
87 
46,62,69, 
87 44,39,40 
R-squared 0.25,0.47, 0.57,0.05 
0.21,0.4, 
0.38,0.03 
0.25,0.32, 
0.3,0.1 
0.23,0.41, 
0.31,0.14 
0.27,0.3, 
0.33,0.1 
0.28,0.31, 
0.29,0.11 
0.53,0.53, 
0.16 
 
Independent variable is average GDP growth for each 10 year period (70s, 80s, 90s, and 00s). Estimation made by three 
stage least squares (3SLS).  Explanatory variables are: Gini and Squared Gini corresponding to the prior period in 
relation to the growth rate period (i.e. for the growth period of 1970 corresponds the Gini value of 1960); the log of per 
capita GDP and the sum of secondary plus tertiary school attainment are expressed in values for the initial year; the log 
of the total fertility rate and the reciprocal of life expectancy at birth, both expressed in  values for the  years 1970, 80, 
90 and 2000; the value for the investment ratio, the price level of investment (PPPI) and the variable that proxies 
political instability by measuring Battle-related deaths are expressed as the average for each decade; a dummy that 
equals one if the country has a developed tax revenue system; a Latin American dummy and finally an interaction term 
that multiplies the Gini  times the redistribution value for the period corresponding to each of the estimated growth 
period. 
33 
 
The instruments are:  the value of the initial year of the period for the price level of investment; the value of the prior 
period for the log of the total fertility rate, the investment ratio and the log of the initial GDP per capita.  
For the other variables, instruments coincide with the explanatory variable. 
* Initial period (70`s) was removed from equation due to data unavailability.    
Table 7 reports the results of a set of dynamic panel model estimated via system GMM. 
This methodology has been proposed to be one of the most reliable estimation technique 
by some relevant studies of the inequality-growth relationship (Castelló-Climent, 2004; 
Castelló-Climent, 2010; Voitchovsky, 2005). The reason is that this methodology, 
developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998), improves the 
also well known first-difference GMM estimation, developed by Arellano and Bond 
(1991) and provides a better estimation by exploiting more efficiently the variation in 
the data as well as the time series information. The technique consists in estimating a 
system of equations in first differences, with lagged explanatory variables as 
instruments, and including the original equation in levels.  
 
The validity of the system GMM is tested by confirming the absence of second order 
serial correlation, as well as with the tests of overidentifying restrictions of Sargan 
(1958) and Hansen (1982). Additionally, with the difference Hansen test for the validity 
of the additional moment conditions for the level equation. 
 
A series of growth equations similar to those in the 3SLS estimations were performed, 
in them, different control variables related to growth where included, as well as others 
related to the theoretical effects of income inequality, such as education or fertility. All 
equations confirm the kinked non linear relationship between inequality and growth, 
with positive and statistically significant coefficients for the Gini variable and negative 
for its squared value. In this case, the breakpoint level of inequality is reached at a Gini 
level of .40, differing only by one point with the previous estimations via SUR and 
3SLS.   In equations 1, 2 and 4 these variables result less significant, the Gini to the 5% 
and its squared value to the 10%, without an evident reason, unless school attainment 
affected the Gini coefficients in equations 2 and 4 and life expectancy did as well in 
equations 1 and 2. There could be some theoretical arguments in favor of this, as they 
are proxies of human capital, which, as seen in the theoretical framework, has been 
proposed to be part of the transmission channel by which inequality affects growth. In 
all equations the log of the total fertility rate depicts the expected negative and 
statistically significant coefficient, reflecting the deflating effects on GDP growth of a 
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bigger population. Equations 1, 3 and 5 include the investment ratio, which even though 
results with the expected positive sign, it never achieves statistical significance.  
 
As in the 3SLS estimations, the reciprocal of life expectancy and secondary and tertiary 
school attainment come out statistically insignificant, nevertheless, in the case of 
education, when including an alternative measure in the form of male secondary school 
enrollment in equations 5 and 6, this new variable comes out positive and statistically 
significant to the 1%. Speculating a bit, one might argue that the reason for this 
difference of results could come from the fact that male/female school attainment 
captures the, still existent, inequalities of access to education for women in some 
countries, which can be growth detrimental.  
 
 
Table 7.  Inequality and growth relationship (System GMM) 
Variables / Equations 1 2 3 4 5* 6 
Intercept 20.9 16.50 15.50 17.00 16.95 17.72 
 (0.0020) (0.0050) (0.0080) (0.0020) (0.0000) (0.0010) 
Inequality 0.31 0.35 0.40 0.34 0.40 0.32 
 (0.049) (0.0430) (0.01) (0.052) (0.001) (0.008) 
Inequality2  -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.0700) (0.0790) (0.0200) (0.0820) (0.0020) (0.0110) 
Ln (per capita GDP) -2.06 -2.07 -2.11 -2.04 -2.36 -2.12 
 (0.0010) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Investment ratio 1.27  2.28  4.30  
 (0.7340)  (0.544)  (0.158)  
Ln (Total fertility rate) -4.71 -5.05 -4.73 -5.00 -4.43 -2.69 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Secondary and tertiary 
school attainment  0.37 0.40 0.30   
  (0.1870) (0.1580) (0.2810)   
Life expectancy -169.96 17.61    -193.47 
 (0.2040) (0.886)    (0.088) 
Male secondary school 
enrollment     2.86 3.45 
          (0.001) (0.0000) 
AR(2) test 0.771 0.998 0.952 0.936 0.614 0.781 
Hansen J test 0.25 0.554 0.525 0.388 0.603 0.708 
Diff Hansen  0.89 0.99 0.985 0.974 0.729 0.88 
Wald Chi2 65.49 80.85 64.72 64.03 73.07 88.49 
Prob. Chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Independent variable is average yearly per capita GDP growth for the period 1960 -2000. 
Estimations are made by system GMM. Explanatory variables are: Gini and Squared Gini 
corresponding to the prior period in relation to the growth rate period (i.e. for the growth period 
of 1970 corresponds the Gini value of 1960); the log of per capita GDP and the sum of secondary 
plus tertiary school attainment, as well as the male secondary enrollment rate are expressed in 
values for the initial year; the log of the total fertility rate and the reciprocal of life expectancy at 
birth, both expressed in  values for the  years 1970, 80, 90 and 2000; the value for the investment 
ratio. The instruments correspond with the explanatory variables and are expressed, according to 
the methodology, in levels and differences. 
* Instruments lagged two periods 
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Equation 5 performs better in general, but specifically in the inequality variables, the 
additional feature apart from the shift in the school variable, is that it was estimated 
with two lags in the instruments of the equation, correcting somewhat more the 
endogeneity of the specification. Finally, equation 6 presents the most reliable equation, 
with all variables statistically significant, including life expectancy (although to the 
10%).  
 
All equations confirm the absence of second order serial correlation, AR(2), and 
favorable results for both Hansen’s tests of overidentifying restrictions and the test for 
the validity of the additional moment conditions for the level equation. 
 
 
An alternative validity test through the Kuznets curve 
 
We now turn to an additional, and perhaps les orthodox, validation for the proposal of 
the existence of an optimal rate of inequality (ORI), in which growth rates are enhanced 
due to the absence of any distortion from either high inequality or high 
redistribution/taxation (low inequality). 
 
This alternative test is meant to use the widely known and generally accepted Kuznets 
hypothesis as the vehicle for validating the hypothesis that countries will grow faster if 
they are at the ORI. The idea is quite straightforward; it first assumes that the Kuznets 
relationship between inequality and development is an empirical regularity18. If so, then 
the implications of the model and the predictions of the Kuznets curve would allow us 
to propose the following: 
 
Proposition 1: A country in its path to development will grow faster when it passes 
through inequality levels within the optimal rate of inequality, during 
the transition predicted by the Kuznets inverted “U” hypothesis, both in 
the initial and the later stages of development. 
 
                                                 
18 This relationship predicts that any country in its path to development would necessarily pass through a 
period of high inequality before they decrease when reaching high levels of development. 
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The previous can be expressed in the context of a sample of countries depicting the 
Kuznets relationship: 
 
Proposition 2: Within a set of countries that follow the Kuznets inverted “U” 
relationship, the ones with inequality levels at the ORI will grow 
faster than the rest, both in the initial as in the later stages of 
development. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The first step is to confirm the validity of the Kuznets relationship in the context of the 
available data set. Graphically it can be seen in Figure 5 that the inverted “U” predicted 
by Kuznets (1955) performs quite clearly in the tendency line depicted for the same 
dataset employed in the previous model estimations.  
 
 
Results 
 
Table 7 presents the estimations for the Kuznets hypothesis. Following Barro (2000) an 
estimation via the Seemingly unrelated regression is performed with the value of the 
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Gini coefficient as dependent variable and the log of the average per capita GDP and its 
square value as independent variables, along with others such as life expectancy, the 
total fertility rate as well as geographical dummies for Latin America and the Sub-
Saharan Africa. The results confirm the Kuznets relationship in all cases, with a positive 
and statistically significant sign for the per capita GDP and a negative and also 
significant sign for its square value. This demonstrates the fact that at initial levels of 
development inequality will tend to grow in order to later be reduced after reaching a 
per capita income of around $3,700 UDS. Including the additional explanatory variables 
does not change the tendency and does not affect the sings or significance of the per 
capita GDP. 
 
 
Table 8. The Kuznets relationship 
Variables / Equations 1 2 3 4 
Ln(p/c GDP) 42.64 48.53 30.82 39.3 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0000 
Ln(p/c GDP)2 -2.78 -3.07 -1.9 -2.33 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0 
1/life expectancy at 
birth   1022.87 634.4 
   0 0.0115 
Log(Total fertility 
rate)    6.84 
    0.0051 
Dummy: Latin 
America   9.71  
   0.0000  
Dummy: Sub-
Saharan Africa  -142.96   
    0.0000     
Intercepts (117.3), (116.7), (113.3), (113.5) 
(146.5), (146.1), 
(142.9), (142.9) 
(102.0), (101.1), 
(97.1), (97.9) 
(143.9), (142.6), 
(138.0), (137.0) 
Number of 
Observations 71, 80, 96, 64 71, 80, 96, 64 69, 77, 93, 64 68,76,92,63 
R-squared 0.30, 0.30,  0.31, 0.36 
0.32, 0.33,  0.33, 
0.33 
0.46, 0.44,  0.38, 
0.59 
0.42, 0.37,  0.32, 
0.35 
Dependant variable: Inequality measured by the Gini coefficient; estimation made by Seemingly Unrelated 
Regression (SUR) technique. Independent variables are: the log of per capita GDP as well as its square value, 
Latin American dummy, sub-Saharan Africa dummy, the log of the total fertility rate and the reciprocal of life 
expectancy at birth. 
 
 
Once the Kuznets curve has been proven as an empirical regularity, we can now 
continue with the empirical confirmation of the propositions stated previously. First, 
with simple statistical evidence, obtained from identifying the observations with optimal 
inequality levels from both sides (less developed and more developed) of the Kuznets 
curve, as well as the rest of the observations and calculating the average growth rate of 
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the three groups of data. The result of this preliminary approximation is that the average 
per capita GDP growth rates for both sides of the curve are higher, with 2.63% for the 
low income group and 2.90% for the high income group. The average GDP per capita 
growth rate for the rest of the observations in the inverted “U” curve are of 2.06% 
percent. 
 
Table 9 presents the results of two sets of estimations intended to test for proposition 
No. 2. The first set of (equations 1 to 3) develop growth regressions similar to those in 
table 6, estimating via 3SLS and including the values of the Gini, its square value, as 
well as other variables standard for this type of growth models. The feature here is the 
addition of a dummy variable that assigns the value 1 to the observations, within the 
Kuznets curve, that have inequality levels in the ORI, in both ends of the curve19 (see 
Figure 5).  
 
The results confirm that, regardless of in which end of the curve the observations are, 
they will have a positive relation with growth, even at the negative side of the curve. 
Even with the inclusion of the Latin American dummy (sometimes accounted for the 
positive effects of inequality on growth in those regions), the coefficients remain 
positive and statistically significant. The other level and control variables perform as 
expected; the reciprocal of life expectancy and the log of the total fertility have a 
negative coefficient, although the inclusion of the Latin American dummy appear to 
affect their significance. The investment ratio has a positive and significant coefficient, 
and the per capita GDP (level variable) as expected has a negative and significant sign, 
depicting the convergence phenomenon. 
 
The second set of estimations (equations 4 to 7) try to further validate the proposition by 
now identifying separately the observations with inequality at the ORI in the low and 
high income ends of the Kuznets curve. For this, it was first identified the income level 
at which the break in the development-inequality relationship occurs in the inverted “U” 
curve, finding it to be at around $3,700 US dollars. With this information it was 
possible to generate a dummy variable that identifies only the observations with 
                                                 
19 Having confirmed the existence of the Kuznets relationship, we know there must be observations in 
with inequality in the ORI that are situated at the lower and higher income side of the curve. 
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inequality at the ORI in the lower income side of the curve (below $3,700 US dollars) 
and another one for the ones at the higher income side of the curve (above $3,700 US 
dollars). Finally, a third dummy variable that captures the observations with inequality 
levels different from the ORI in the curve in order to use as control variable. 
 
 
Table 9. Validation of the Optimal rate of inequality (ORI) through the Kuznets  relationship 
Variables / Equations 1 2 3 4* 5* 6* 7* 
Gini 0.16 0.19 0.17     
 0.0500 0.0156 0.0371     
(Gini)2 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002     
 0.0268 0.0074 0.0254     
Dummy: Optimal rate of 
inequality (ORI) 0.71 0.74 0.67     
 0.0090 0.0064 0.0139     
Dummy: ORI low PIB    1.26  0.8  
    0.0032  0.100  
Dumm: No ORI (rest of 
sample)     -1.2 -1.01 -1.08 
     0.0001 0.0029 0.0159 
Dummy: ORI high PIB    1.06   0.31 
    0.0009   0.5301 
1/life expectancy at birth -87.21  -132.86     
 0.1649  0.0443     
Log(Total fertility rate) -1.54 -1.67 -1.3     
 0.0157 0.0061 0.0427     
Investment ratio 5.78 6.08 5.28 10.72 10.11 10.08 10.96 
 0.0052 0.0031 0.0099 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Log(per capita GDP) -1.12 -0.99 -1.07 -0.64 -0.63 -0.58 -0.69 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0005 0.0007 0.0024 0.0001 
Dummy: Latin America   -0.53     
      0.0413         
Intercepts 
11.8, 
10.4, 
10.4, 10.5 
8.71, 
7.33, 
7.33, 7.39 
11.67, 
10.26, 
10.25, 
10.32 
6.02, 
4.68, 
5.03 
7.26, 
6.17, 
6.31 
6.65, 
5.36, 
5.63 
7.49, 
6.34, 
6.63 
Number of Observations 46, 62, 69, 87 
46, 62, 
69, 87 
46,62,69, 
87 44,61,73 
47, 64, 
73 
45, 62, 
73 
45, 62, 
72 
R-squared 
0.28, 
0.37, 
0.30, 0.09 
0.25, 
0.37, 
0.29, 0.14 
0.25,0.41, 
0.32, 0.09 
0.17, 
0.42, 
0.23 
0.15, 
0.38, 
0.11 
0.13, 
0.43, 
0.14 
0.17, 
0.41, 
0.21 
Independent variable is average GDP growth for each 10 year period (70s, 80s, 90s, and 00s). Estimation made by 
three stage least squares (3SLS).  Explanatory variables are: Gini and Squared Gini corresponding to the prior 
period in relation to the growth rate period (i.e. for the growth period of 1970 corresponds the Gini value of 1960); 
a dummy variable in which observations where the Gini coefficient is in the Optimal rate of inequality (around 
0.39) have a value of 1; the log of per capita GDP;  the log of the total fertility rate and the reciprocal of life 
expectancy at birth, both expressed in  values for the  years 1970, 80, 90 and 2000; the value for the investment 
ratio is expressed as the average for each decade; a Latin American dummy; a dummy variable that takes the value 
of 1 for observations below the Kuznets breakpoint (around $3,700) with Gini around 39; a dummy that takes the 
value of 1 for observations above the Kuznets breakpoint; finally, a dummy that takes the value of 1 for 
observations whose value is not in the ORI in the whole sample. Probabilities for the T-statistics are shown in 
parenthesis. 
The instruments are:   the value of the prior period for the log of the total fertility rate, the investment ratio and the 
log of the initial GDP per capita; for the other variables, instruments coincide with the explanatory variable. 
* Final period (2000`s) was removed due to data unavailability. 
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Equation 4 includes both the low and high income dummies and finds that they are both 
positive and statistically significant, while equation 5 includes the dummy for the non 
ORI observations and results with a negative and also significant coefficient. The 
important results comes from comparing both estimations, we can clearly see how the 
countries with inequality levels in the ORI have a positive influence on growth, while 
the ones with inequality levels different from the ORI have in fact a negative effect on 
growth rates, thus validating proposition No. 2. 
 
Equations 6 and 7 compare separately each of the ORI dummies with the control non-
ORI variable in order to further confirm this relationship. In the first estimation  
(Equation 6) it is found once again that the observations in ORI levels for the low 
income part of the Kuznets relationship are positively related to growth (although barely 
significant to the 10%), while the rest of the observations are negatively related. The last 
equation confirms the same for the high income side of the curve; nevertheless, here the 
dummy turns out statistically insignificant while the control non-ORI dummy remains 
negative and significant, perhaps because of the limited number of observations within 
the ORI in both sides of the curve. It is worth mentioning that when attempting to 
include all three dummies in one equation they perform quite poorly, this, is assumed to 
be the result of the fact that, together, the three dummies account for all the observations 
in the curve and for not having a control variable left out from the estimation. 
 
Bibliometric study 
 
In the prior section it was empirically demonstrated the existence of a kinked non linear 
relationship between inequality and growth. Countries with low levels of inequality 
exert a positive relationship with economic growth and countries with high inequality 
have a negative one, additionally, there is a certain level of inequality where the 
relationship becomes non-significant and where growth is maximized. 
 
In this section it is verified how this principles hold for most previous empirical studies 
and how the contrasting results in previous literature can be explained in terms of the 
constitution and the predominant level of inequality in the samples employed by the 
authors.  
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The proposition is that the empirical results of some of the most influential studies of 
the relationship between income inequality and economic growth can in fact be 
explained under the arguments of the model presented above. In this sense, the 
following scenarios are expected: 
 
1. In studies where the database was predominantly configured by countries with 
high levels of inequality the sign of the relationship was negative. 
2. In studies where the database was composed mainly by countries with low levels 
of inequality the sign of the encountered relationship was positive. 
3. Studies in which a statistically insignificant relationship was found may fall 
under the following circumstances: 
a. A sample of countries with balanced levels of inequality that neutralize 
each other. Approximately, the same values on the positive and the 
negative side of the income distribution. 
b. A sample of countries with similar levels of inequality at intermediate 
levels20. 
 
A sample of 11 empirical studies (widely cited in the literature), which identified the 
relationship between income inequality and economic growth, were selected. Three of 
them (Li, 1998; Forbes, 2000; Castelló-Climent, 2004) found a positive relationship and 
eight (Alesina, 1993; Alesina, 1994; Barro, 2008; Castelló and Doménech, 2002; De la 
Croix, 2003; Garbis, 2005; Knowles, 2005; Persson and Tabellini, 1994) a negative one.  
 
The procedure was to analyze each dataset used by the above mentioned authors and to 
classify the countries in the sample according to their average level of inequality21, 
                                                 
20 Because of the reasons exposed in the model there is no inequality level or range in which a statistically 
insignificant relation is expected to be found for all countries, this is why this scenario is highly 
improbable. Nevertheless, according to the previous empirical results, the inequality level may fall in a 
Gini value near .39.  
21 The country classification, according to inequality levels, was made by averaging the Gini index value 
for the period of 1960 to 2000 for the countries included in the datasets. Afterwards the countries were 
classified in low inequality (Gini index below .355), medium inequality (between .356 and .42) and high 
inequality (values above .42). The criterion for this classification, although subjective, was based on the 
results of the empirical estimation. 
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defining, this way, the predominant level of inequality in that sample and verifying the 
predictions of the model. 
 
Results 
 
The results confirmed, in all cases, the expected scenarios. Table 1 depicts the results of 
the analysis22. The sample of all eight empirical studies who found a negative 
relationship between inequality and growth were composed predominantly with 
observations for countries with high average levels of inequality. Six of them (Alesina 
and Perotti, 1996; Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; Barro, 2008; Castelló and Doménech, 
2002; De la Croix and Doepke, 2003; Garbis, 2005; Knowles, 2005; Persson, 1994), 
with over 50% of the sample composed of high average inequality countries. In most 
cases the amount of countries with high inequality was twice as numerous as the ones 
with low inequality and in two of them the relation was three to one. 
 
Although the majority of the empirical studies have found a negative relationship, there 
are a few influential papers that claim a positive effect of income inequality over 
economic growth. Among the most cited are the ones from (Castelló-Climent (2004), 
Forbes (2000), Li and Zou (1998). These papers were also selected for this bibliometric 
study in order to find if the positive sign derives from the composition of the sample. 
 
The results, after analyzing the distribution of countries in their sample according to 
inequality levels, confirm the propositions of the model. Although not with the same 
proportions as the studies with a negative relationship, all three studies were carried out 
with samples composed predominantly of countries with low levels of inequality.  
 
Li & Zou (1998) used a sample of 46 countries, extracted from the D & S dataset, of 
which 48% are low average inequality countries, 39% high inequality and 13% 
intermediate inequality. Forbes (2000) sample distribution accounts for 45% low 
inequality countries and 35% high, as cited by the author “regional coverage is far from 
representative, with no countries from sub-Saharan Africa and nearly half the sample 
from the OECD” (Forbes, 2000). Finally, Castelló-Climent (2004) employs in her 
                                                 
22 See Appendix 4 for the complete results of the bibliometric study. 
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sample 41% and 37% of low and high average inequality countries respectively (see 
Appendix 4). 
 
The prediction that in studies with databases composed mainly by countries with low 
levels of inequality the sign of the encountered relationship was positive remains as an 
empirical regularity. 
 
Although it was impossible to find studies with available datasets that found non-
significant coefficient in the inequality-growth relationship, the following comments are 
presented on two relevant works: 
 
• Panizza (2002) finds a weak negative sign in the relationship between inequality 
and growth for the US economy, estimating with a panel dataset for the period 
of 1940 to 1980. Although the dataset is not available, the descriptive statistics 
in the paper depict an average Gini index of .42 (just above the ORI found in 
this study) in the referred period. This average Gini level and the lack of 
robustness in the negative coefficient lead to suspect the possibility of the 
inequality levels to be just passed optimal rate of inequality and on the initial 
phase of the negative side of relationship between the variables. 
• Barro (2000) finds a statistically insignificant coefficient in the inequality-
growth relationship when estimating a system via 3SLS. He employed a 138 
country panel data covering from about 1955 to the mid 90`s. Although the 
inequality dataset is not available, one can see from the descriptive statistics a 
mean Gini value of 41.2 for the four periods included in the sample. This value 
suggests average inequality levels near the ORI if we take as reference the 
results of the empirical study presented above and if we account for the fact that 
both (Barro´s and mine) samples derive fundamentally from the same D & S 
dataset.  
Even though some authors confirm a reduction in global inequality levels over the last 
decades (Sala-i-Martin, 2006; Sala-i-Martin, 2009), the amount of countries with high 
income inequality (higher than the ORI) is still much higher than those with low levels. 
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The more number of countries included in a sample, the higher the probability of being 
predominantly composed of high inequality countries. 
 
Table 10. Bibliometric study results
Author Year Relation Methodology High GINI Medium GINI Low GINI 
Alesina and 
Rodik 1991 Negative OLS, 2SLS 51% 23% 26% 
Alesina and 
Perotti 1993 Negative 2SLS  56% 20% 24% 
 Persson and 
Tabellini 1994 Negative OLS / 2SLS0 42% 27% 31% 
Castelló and 
Doménech 2002 Negative N/A 58% 18% 24% 
De la Croix and 
Doepke 2003 Negative GMM 62% 19% 19% 
Garbis Iradian 2005 Negative GMM and OLS 41% 27% 32% 
Stephen Knowles 2005 Negative N/A 53%, 69% 12%, 26% 35%, 5% 
Robert J. Barro 2008 
Negative 
(with full 
sample) 
GMM 50% 21% 29% 
Li & Zou 1998 Positive Fixed effects & Random Effects 39% 13% 48% 
Kristin J. Forbes 2000 Positive Arellano & Bond differential GMM 35% 20% 45% 
Amparo 
Castelló-Climent 2004 Positive 
OLS, fixed effects,  
random eff. 
Differential-
GMM, System-
GMM 
37% 21% 41% 
 
Discussion 
 
This paper suggests that there could be a fundamental weakness in the way the debate 
over the “real” relationship between inequality and growth has been developed, and 
proposes a reformulation of the initial question it is trying to answer: Is inequality 
harmful of beneficial for growth?, as an initial step for reaching a generalized solution. 
This reformulation would lead to establishing new research questions: should we expect 
inequality to exert any single effect over economic performance? Is it acceptable to 
expect every level of inequality to affect growth in the same manner?, these and other 
questions, that take us back to the starting point of a new inequality-growth debate. 
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The main proposition of this study is that the level of inequality is the one determining 
the sign of the relationship. At low levels of inequality the relationship is positive and, 
as inequality increases, the sign of the relationship changes to a negative effect of 
inequality over growth. Additionally, the model developed above proves the existence 
of an Optimal Rate of Inequality (ORI) in which growth is optimized and the economy 
is liberated from the negative effects of high inequality or high taxation/redistribution.  
 
The results of the empirical study provide cross country evidence and confirmed the 
validity of the model. Countries with inequality levels below a Gini index of inequality 
of 0.39 depict a positive relationship in their inequality and growth relationship. 
Accordingly, economies with income inequality above that level have a negative 
relationship with growth, meaning that more inequality affects negatively the growth 
performance of the economy. The overall relationship turned to be negative, 
consistently with other studies that employed similar datasets, as the result of having the 
majority of the observations in the negative range of the relationship. These results also 
evidence the existence of an ORI, situated at the breakpoint inequality level of 0.39, in 
which growth rates are maximized, in relation to the negative effects of different 
inequality levels.  
 
The bibliometric study provided empirical evidence to demonstrate the fact that the 
proposed relationship between inequality and growth holds for the results of the most 
widely cited empirical studies in this area, and how the contrasting results in previous 
literature can be explained in terms of the constitution and the predominant level of 
inequality in the samples employed by the authors. This can be seen as a conciliatory 
resolution for the different results in the literature over the inequality-growth 
relationship. 
 
The policy implications are clear, inequality does matter for growth. Policy makers who 
intend to develop the conditions for enhanced economic growth should take into 
account the prevailing income inequality levels. Ensuring that they are at the optimal 
levels, would release the growth determinants from the potentially detrimental effects of 
too high or too low inequality (and the associated high taxes).  
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Appendix 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 1: The non linearity in the effect of inequality over growth, the optimal rate 
of inequality and the level of redistribution necessary to reach it. 
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coefficients) 
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of the relationship of inequality and growth. 
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